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Introduction: A trust gap between citizens and the public sector? 
Declining trust between citizens and the public sector has been high on the public agenda for quite a 
while now. Such declining trust and sometimes even increasing distrust has been related to issues 
such as the emergence of new political parties running on an anti-government sentiment, aggression 
of citizens towards civil servants, a low attractiveness of public employment, public organisations’ 
desire to demand ever more proof from citizens when taking decisions, or increased government 
surveillance. Such evidence of declining trust can be complemented by an almost equally substantial 
body of evidence of stable or increasing levels of trust. Examples are a desire to involve citizens in 
public decision-making, an absence of large-scale visible challenging of government decisions, and a 
move towards less coercive and more collaborative relations between the public sector and citizens.  
We take Möllering’s (2006: 111) definition of trust as starting point: ‘trust is an ongoing process of 
building on reason, routine and reflexivity, suspending irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty 
as if they were favourably resolved, and maintaining thereby a state of favourable expectation toward 
the actions and intentions of more or less specific others’. We thus assume that knowledge about 
specific others alone does not warrant trust; it also involves some sort of faith that is not explained by 
knowledge. Distrust also reduces uncertainty, but in a different way: it does not involve a leap of 
faith, since it involves negative expectations toward people’s intentions and intentions (Van de Walle 
& Six, 2014).  
In this chapter, we distinguish between two trust relationships. One is that of citizens in the public 
sector. The other is that of the public sector in citizens. The focus will thus be on relationships 
between citizens and the public sector. Trust relationships between public organisations themselves 
will not be discussed in this chapter. We will first look at signals and evidence that trust is changing – 
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both in the direction of more trust, and in the direction of less trust and more distrust. Then, we 
discuss initiatives aimed at increasing trust and reducing distrust between citizens and the public 
sector, both at the institutional level, and at the level of specific encounters between citizens and 
public services or public servants. We end by formulating a research agenda to study trust and distrust 
in and by the public sector, to counter the current scarcity of empirical literature on trust in and by the 
public sector. 
Citizen trust in the public sector- signals and evidence 
Public sector reforms have often been motivated by a presumed lack of public trust in public services 
(Bok, 2001; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2007). Public services are said to be either inefficient, 
wasteful and ineffective, or power-hungry with little eye for citizens’ needs and desires. Political 
rhetoric in itself is however insufficient to get a coherent picture of the extent to which citizens 
actually trust the public sector, public services, and individual public servants. To construct such a 
picture, one needs to look at various pieces of evidence. In this section we look at several pieces of 
evidence. First, we discuss attitudes as measured in polls. Then we look at citizen voice, or the ways 
in which citizens express their discontent. This can range from mere complaining, to going to court, or 
to becoming outright aggressive during interaction with the public sector. Finally, one can look at exit 
behaviours, whereby citizens decide to end their relation with the public sector. While trust in the 
public sector has been at the core of reform debates, the academic literature on trust in the public 
sector is remarkably scarce.  
Attitudes 
Citizen trust in the public sector is traditionally measured through opinion surveys that contain a 
number of items on the public sector. Changes in political trust have been well documented, yet for 
trust in public administration, far fewer indicators are available. Established surveys such as the 
World Values surveys, the American National Election Studies, the European Social Survey, or 
various Barometers (Eurobarometer, Latinobarómetro, Asia and Asian Barometer) have collected 
information about attitudes towards a number of specific public services, as well as more general 
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attitudes toward the public sector, bureaucracy, or government. Many of these measurements are 
fairly recent. Where such data is available, there is no apparent trend of decreasing trust in the public 
sector (Van de Walle, 2008), although there is wide variation across institutions and countries. More 
specific evidence regarding citizens’ attitudes to public services can be found in the literature on 
satisfaction with services, but this material tends not to use the concept ‘trust’. Seminal works in this 
respect have been written by Goodsell (1983, ‘the case for bureaucracy’) or Katz et al. (1977). 
Many public services are among the most trusted institutions. Examples are schools, the health 
system, or the fire services. Individuals within these services enjoy even more trust, especially when it 
concerns teachers, doctors or firefighters. Opinions on the army and defence personnel are more 
mixed – very positive in some countries, but negative in others. At the same time, citizens tend to 
have low trust in more abstract institutions of functions, such as public administration, civil servants, 
or bureaucrats (Van de Walle & Van Ryzin, 2011). They also tend to place high trust in their own 
local school, hospital and so on, yet tend to be more critical about the school system of health system 
as a whole (Cowell et al., 2012). Trust in public services also to a large extent depends on the process 
through which services are delivered, and not just on the actual outcomes of interactions with the 
public sector (Van Ryzin, 2011). Finally, trust can be based on actual experiences and interactions, 
but also on generalised attitudes towards others and towards government (Houston & Howard 
Harding, 2013; Marlowe, 2004). 
While information on attitudes is fairly easy to collect, and measurement practice is improving (see 
e.g. Grimmelikhuijsen & Knies, 2015), attitudes do not tell us all there is to know about trust in the 
public sector. For governments themselves, attitudes become important when they are associated with 
behaviours. Researchers have also started paying closer attention to behaviours rather than to 
attitudes.  
Voice 
A first type of behaviour to look at when assessing whether citizens trust the public sector, is by 
looking at what Hirschman (1970) has called ‘voice’. Voice is a response to a perceived decline in a 
(public) organisation. When citizens use voice, they signal a problem in the organisation, a signal that 
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can then be used by the organisation to repair. Such voice can consist of formal and informal 
complaints or of complaints through ombudsmen, or it can become more public and political when 
citizens take their compliant to social media or to a political forum. Voting for an anti-system party or 
a party that promises to do away with wasteful government is another example. Voice can also be 
organized collectively, and then becomes visible in organised interest groups, consumer committees, 
or more ad-hoc protests against public sector organisations. Examples include for instance protests 
against discriminatory police practices, the planned implantation of an asylum seekers centre etc. 
Voice can be a powerful signal and often confrontational, and is especially important to monitor in a 
public sector context where citizen do not always have the option to stop interacting with a public 
service (Dowding & John, 2012). 
Aggression against public servants 
Another type of behaviour is citizen aggression against public servants. This could be considered an 
extreme type of voice, or even beyond, and clearly signals discontent or frustration. Aggression 
towards public servants is receiving increasing attention, both in academia and among policy makers. 
Such aggression can take a fairly low-key appearance, such as shouting, but could also be more 
serious, in the form of stalking, stabbing, or even murdering public employees (Tummers, 2016). One 
such event, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, in which a US government building was targeted, 
served as the inspiration for Nye et al.’s 1997 book ‘ Why People don’t Trust Government’ (Nye et 
al., 1997)  
Legalization of interactions 
A less extreme signal of potentially low levels of citizen trust in the public sector is a legalization of 
interactions, as is apparent in string rule following and the use of extensive contractual arrangements 
to regulate interactions. This is a specific expression of a trend towards legalistic organizations (Sitkin 
& Bies, 1993). Whilst it is true that contract-like arrangements make trust between parties possible, 
the extensive use of contracts may also mean that that trust was absent in the first place (see, e.g. 
Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Sitkin and Bies suggested such legalization does little to restore trust 
(Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Such legalization makes delivering public services increasingly expensive with 
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transaction costs spiralling. Where voice is a first line of defence against public services that do not 
live up to expectation, citizens going to court is a second. A lack of trust then becomes visible in the 
number of lawsuits citizens wage against government, or the number of appeals through various 
appeal boards. Examples can be found throughout the public sectors, ranging from students appealing 
against their grades, over citizens suing their local government for defective infrastructure, to 
companies appealing against procurement decisions. It remains unclear though whether such an 
increase is due to declining trust, or the result of previously silent citizens now knowing what their 
rights are. The opposite trend also appears to exist, with relations between government and citizens or 
between government and other public and private actors becoming increasingly based on informal 
norms and new steering mechanisms not governed by law or contracts, but by long term established 
relations of trust (see Groeneveld & Van de Walle, 2011 for an overview). 
Exit 
A final signal one can use to assess the state of citizen trust in the public sector is what Hirschman 
(1970) called exit, or citizens turning their back to the public sector and moving elsewhere. Exit is a 
response to failing public service (Dowding & John, 2008). Exit can take many different forms, for 
instance when parents decide to start home-schooling their children or to set up their own care-
initiative for a disabled child (Gofen, 2015), or when communities start using their own dispute 
settlement mechanism or set up their own security services. It can also mean moving from a public to 
a private provider in health care or education, or even moving to alternative providers such as 
homeopaths or natural healers when trust in the public health system is low. Exit can also take the 
form of total exit, when citizens decide to end their relationship to a public service altogether. 
Extreme forms of exit are visible in e.g. anti-vaccination movements or communities of off-gridders. 
Non-entry is an alternative approach. Non-entry means that citizens do not even make the decision to 
start using public service (Rokkan, 1974). Other scholars have used the term ‘non-take-up’ of public 
services referring to citizens who are entitled to use a service but who have decided not to make use of 
them (Warin, 2008). Distrust is an important explanation for such non-take-up. It occurs especially in 
relations to welfare services when citizens are for instance distrustful of the motives of a social 
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service or youth affairs department, when they suspect the education system of brainwashing their 
children, or when immigrants decide not to register with immigration departments. 
Public sector trust in citizens – signals and evidence 
When trust in the public sector is discussed or studied, attention mainly goes to citizens’ trust in the 
public sector. The other side of the trust relationship generally receives less attention: the public 
sector’s trust in citizens. The public sector and the people working therein also make decisions about 
the trustworthiness of citizens when interacting with them. This is important, because making an 
incorrect judgement may mean that disproportionate burdens are inflicted on citizens to prove their 
case, or that citizens get away with benefits they are not entitled to. Some citizens are considered 
trustworthy, and hence not subject to elaborate surveillance or coercion, whereas other citizens are 
seen as untrustworthy and therefore to be monitored. Meeting with citizens who are untrustworthy is 
quite common for public servants, and many public organisations exist precisely because of this 
assumption – think for instance about police forces, tax inspections, or parking wardens. Again, one 
can look at various signals and evidence to establish whether or not public servants trust the citizens 
they are supposed to serve, and whether distrust also plays a role in this. These signals are located 
both at the level of delivery and at the level of policymaking.  
Surveillance, monitoring and control 
When governments use an elaborate array of monitoring and surveillance tools, this may tell us 
something about the public sector’s trust in citizens. It is not entirely clear though what it tells us (Van 
de Walle, 2016). Monitoring and surveillance tools have become ever more omnipresent, and the 
public sector’s capacity to control has increased (Power, 1999). The public sector combines datasets 
and constructs profiles of citizens and citizen groups. One the one hand, one could see the presence of 
such surveillance as an indication that government and public servants distrust citizens and deploy 
monitoring tools to punish untrustworthy behaviours. Monitoring tools are then substitutes of trust. 
On the other hand, having more information about the trustee makes it easier to decide whether or not 
to extend trust. Monitoring tools are then complements to trust.  
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The dominant reasoning in the literature however appears to be that the increase in monitoring tools 
reflects an increasing distrust in citizens. Indeed, a move to new public management–style steering 
arrangements brought with it a strong rhetoric about citizen empowerment (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992), but did in fact institutionalise a range of distrust-based instruments. (Van de Walle, 2010). 
More recently, one can also observe a gradual trend towards transferring the burden of proof away 
from the public sector to the citizen, as was already the case in taxation issues.  
Public involvement in decision-making 
Whether or not public servants trust citizens can also be deduced form their general willingness to 
involve citizens in policy making. This is a quite contentious topic, because public servants are often 
quite reluctant to involve citizens, who are sometime seen as untrustworthy (Yang, 2006). The main 
reasons for such attitude are perceived lack of ability on the part of citizens to understand complex 
policy issues, and fear that citizens will mainly try to further their own self-interest rather than the 
common good (Moyson et al., 2016). The extent to which citizens are involved in actual decision 
making, within but also beyond legal involvement requirements, gives a good indication of their 
perceived trustworthiness.  
Closing the trust gap 
Distrust is an essential building block of the relation between citizens and the public sector. 
Dysfunctional effects of such distrust, such as the need for documentation, control-mechanisms and 
high transaction costs are at the core of how governments function, which is seen as way to protect 
citizens against illegal government actions or too strong concentration of power. Low citizen trust in 
the public sector can be seen as a healthy attitude leading to proper oversight, and low public sector 
trust in citizens as a necessity to avoid abuse of public means (see also Möllering, 2006; Hardin, 
2002). Still, a desire to build more trust is at the centre of many public sector modernisation 
initiatives, with an aim to lower transaction costs and to become more effective in service delivery. 
Such measures to build trust and reduce distrust operate at different levels: the institutional level and 
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the interpersonal level. A number of measures have received a fair degree of attention in the public 
administration literature and are discussed below. 
At the institutional level we see a strong focus on increasing transparency as a means of increasing 
trust. We also see a tendency away from command-and-control based ways of working to trust-based 
working. At the level of the actual encounter between citizens and the public sector we see for 
example that frontline tax officials have more leeway to look at the specificity of each case, and to 
reach agreements with taxpayers when the latter have proven to be trustworthy. When we look at 
social services, we see a trend in which public officials do not take professional responsibility for 
citizens’ situations, but in which professionals stress citizens’ own responsibility or in which the 
latter’s wishes are uncritically met (Eikenaar et al., 2015). In these instances, professionals do not 
adopt the role of ‘omniscient expert’, but both trust citizens’ capacity to indicate what they need, as 
their intentions as to why they need a service.  
Creating trust and reducing distrust - institutional solutions 
Transparency 
One way of attempting to increase trust between citizens and the public sector consists of improving 
transparency. Prominent examples are the widespread adoption of freedom of information laws and 
publicly available indicators and rankings about the performance of public institutions (Van de Walle 
& Roberts, 2008). But it is not just government that is made more transparent. Government are also 
obtaining ever more information about citizens, making citizens more transparent. These two types of 
transparency can be seen as attempts to make knowledge- or information-based trust possible. Despite 
transparency’s prominent place on the agenda of many political movements, the contribution of 
transparency to trust is not entirely convincing. Making the public sector or citizens transparent may 
also give rise to more reasons to distrust each other (see e.g. Etzioni, 2010). Good examples are the 
publication of politicians’ and public servants’ expense accounts or Wikileaks.  
Experimental research by Grimmelikhuijsen (2014) found that the effect of increased transparency of 
government organisations on citizen trust is limited. Indeed, many decision-making bodies operate 
behind closed doors, because transparency is expected to decrease the quality of decision-making, or 
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may undermine institutional trust when it would become visible that public decision-making is not 
always rational or when it would appear that decisions are not always based on generalizable 
principles (Chamber, 2004). Examples are decisions of judges, some appeals boards, juries, peace 
negotiations, recruitment committees, or talks between a monarch and his or her ministers. Full 
transparency could also undermine the effectiveness of measures, such as when a decision would lead 
to higher property prices, or when a bank or currency is to be saved.  
Trust-based working 
Dissatisfaction with the enormous transaction costs as a result of relying on distrust-based 
mechanisms and extensive control and surveillance mechanisms has stimulated a gradual move 
towards trust-based working within the public sector. This is visible in a number of areas (see also 
Groeneveld & Van de Walle, 2011). One example is the area of public and public-private 
partnerships, where scholars focus on the need for trust between partners to make policy and delivery 
networks function (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Huxham and Vangen, 2005). A similar evolution is 
visible in contracting and commissioning relationships where partners commit to each other for the 
long term, rather than having a short-term antagonistic relationship governed by extensive contracts 
and dispute-settlement mechanisms (Greve, 2009). A final example comes from the literature on 
inspections and regulators where initiatives such as self-regulation or responsive regulation are 
replacing more punitive regulation styles (see Six, 2013 for an overview).  
Creating trust and reducing distrust in bureaucratic encounters 
Institutional solutions are emphasized in the public administration literature, giving more room to 
frontline public officials to involve citizens and establish trust. However, whether and how trust is or 
is not established in official-citizen interactions is often neglected. While not explicitly addressed, the 
street-level bureaucracy literature (based on Lipsky, 1980) suggests that trustworthiness judgments 
are part and parcel of frontline public service work. For social workers, as example, it has always 
been problematic to determine disability of a citizen, ‘because physical and mental incapacity are 
conditions that can be feigned for secondary gain’ (Stone, 1984: 23). Since it is assumed that people 
have incentives to escape the labor market, ‘the concept of disability has always been based on a 
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perceived need to detect deception’ (ibid.: 23). The traditional top-down bureaucracies, then, are based 
on distrust encounters with citizens.   
Nowadays, however, there appears to be the assumption among public administration scholars and 
policy makers alike, that citizens’ trust in government is related to the trust governments have in 
citizens: ‘citizens will not trust public administrators if they know or feel that public officials do not trust 
them’ (Yang, 2005: 273). Hence, the interaction between public officials and citizens has come to the 
forefront and is increasingly seen as a valuable phenomenon for study in itself (Bartels, 2013). The 
public encounter, the place where officials and citizens meet, is seen as crucial aspect in fostering trust, 
commitment and collaboration between public officials and citizens (Bartels, 2013), which in turn could 
help to democratize and legitimate the state (Peters, 2004). This is not only discernable in social 
welfare agencies, but also in organizations engaged in the more traditional regulation and law 
enforcement functions of the government, such as inspection agencies and tax administrations (e.g. 
Burgemeestre et al., 2010; Leviner, 2009; Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; Sakurai, 2002). This trend in 
(street-level) bureaucracies towards more horizontal relationships with citizens, then, shifts attention 
from detecting deception and untrustworthiness to establishing trust relationships.  
The street-level bureaucracy literature suggests that officials’ trustworthiness judgments are affected by 
different factors: citizens’ characteristics, officials’ mind-sets and working routines, and their work 
context.  
Goodwill and competence  
Frontline work is essentially about categorizing citizens: who is trustworthy and who isn’t, based on 
both organizational classification systems and rules, as cultural schemes, moral beliefs and 
stereotypes (Dubois, 2013; Hasenfeld, 2000; Kingfisher, 1998; Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003; Mennerick, 1974; Prottas, 1979). The specific categories a public official looks at 
depends on the specific policy fields s/he is working in (e.g. disability benefits, work reintegration, 
horizontal inspection), but also on the type of work s/he is doing (service provision or regulation), and 
the organizational norms and culture (stringent or more room for discretion). The street-level 
bureaucracy literature points out that public service workers are generally concerned with distinguishing 
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the deserving from undeserving citizens (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). Besides assessing 
whether there is a ‘real need’, frontline public officials also look at the moral deservingness of citizens 
(Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Møller & Stone, 2013).  
Deserving citizens are believed to be benevolent towards the government and individual officials: 
‘morally worthy citizens do not try to con or scam workers or the system’ (Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003: 104). It is held that citizens, even with genuine needs, ‘who try to manipulate the 
system for undue advantage are labeled troublemakers’ (ibid.: 104). Although these citizens are not 
withheld the services, workers do not go out of their way to help the manipulative and over-demanding 
citizens. Such citizens are viewed with suspicion, since they might be driven by other reasons, beyond 
a ‘real disability’, to apply for a service. Moreover, worthy clients are considered good investments in 
the long run: ‘if citizens have genuine needs, are of good character, and are motivated to respond to 
treatment, then they are likely to repay society for street-level workers’ investments of time, effort and 
money’ (ibid.: 106). In this sense, they trust those citizens that make workers’ investment worth the 
effort.  
 
The literature on regulatory encounters theorizes about how regulators’ enforcement styles influence 
citizens’ compliance with rules and regulation, and about the latter’s motivations for complying or not 
complying (e.g. Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Bardach & Kagan, 1982/2002; Mascini & Van Wijk, 
2009). Much research has been done on how regulatees can be classified in terms of their compliance. 
Kagan and Scholz (1984) distinguish three types of regulatees: the amoral calculator who justifies 
non-compliance by economic opportunity and profit; the political citizen who generally complies with 
legislation but is prepared to disobey in case of principled disagreement; and the organizational 
incompetent regulatee whose violations are unintended. This suggests that the category of compliance 
encompasses two aspects of trustworthiness: a regulatee must be competent and willing to abide by 
the law.  
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Public officials’ mind-sets and working routines  
Besides citizen characteristics, also officials’ mind-sets and working routines affect whether trust is 
established and distrust minimalized within the public encounter. Officials who are in public service for 
over thirty years probably have a different outlook on their work and clientele than their less seasoned 
colleagues (e.g. Blau, 1960; Engbersen, 2006). In this vein, Blau (1960) talks about the reality shock 
newcomers experience when they first enter public welfare agencies:  
‘Finding out that people one has trusted have lied is a threatening experience. It implies that one has 
been made a fool of and that others are laughing behind his back at his naiveté. To protect his ego 
against these threats, a case worker is under pressure to change his orientation toward clients. If he 
anticipates deception by distrusting the statements of recipients, their lies no longer pose a threat to his 
ego’ (p. 349). 
Moreover, more tenured and newly hired employees likely differ in their mindsets not only because of 
years of experience in working with citizens, but also because they are differently trained. Where 
distrust-based encounters were commonplace in the traditional machine-like bureaucracies, nowadays 
public organizations also want their employees to be open and trusting toward citizens. New institutional 
solutions such as trust-based working give more room for interpretation to frontline workers, and mean 
officials also need to be willing to trust citizens. Moreover, since there is more room for interpretation, 
there will likely be differences in judgments between frontline officials, leading to different decisions. 
When trust or distrust serves as an attitude in itself, positive or negative expectations ‘colour all aspects 
of interaction, and influence even the most basic perceptions of the other’ (Van de Walle & Six, 2014: 
162). The same situation, then, could be differently judged by people who have different dispositions 
(ibid).  
Digitalization is another trend that affects how citizens are classified, and that supports the making of 
judgments on trustworthiness. The public encounter increasingly proceeds indirectly via telephone or 
email (screen-level bureaucracy), or is even totally automated and pre-programmed involving no contact 
with a ‘real official’ (system-level bureaucracy) (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). One the one hand, this 
could make the bureaucratic process more transparent, enabling citizens to access more information in a 
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codified manner (Margetts, 2006). Moreover, since interactions are codified, this lead to more 
consistency in how cases are treated. On the other hand, formalized digital interactions also take away or 
diminish officials’ discretion at the frontline, making it harder to be responsive towards citizens’ 
particular circumstances. It might be easier to be responsive to a citizen when encountering him/her in 
person, than when only knowing him/her ‘on paper’. The street-level bureaucracy literature shows that 
frontline officials look at citizens’ attitude and behavior in the interaction in order to judge their 
deservingness (e.g. Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Erickson, 1975). What characteristics do 
officials look at when they only have indirect contact with citizens? Is there still room for 
responsiveness (could be trust and distrust) when officials need to fill out fixed templates on a 
computer? How does this impersonal contact affect citizens’ trust in the government? 
Moreover, when bureaucracies do not employ street-level bureaucrats who handle individual cases, but 
mainly employees involved in data and system management, we need to extend our focus to the 
discretionary powers of system designers, legal policy staff and IT experts (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). 
What consequences do algorithms employed by information systems, for instance, have for how citizens 
are classified? Is a generalized trust and distrust in certain social groupings, then, translated in these 
algorithms? The notion of responsiveness, then, shifts from being interpersonal, between officials and 
citizens, to being impersonal; ‘the system’ is responsive to certain social groupings with specific 
characteristics that are believed to deserve a different treatment.   
This also relates to the role of paper forms in bureaucracies, mediating the relationship between officials 
and citizens (See Hull, 2012 for an overview). Weber (1921/1968) viewed the use of documents in 
bureaucracy as the perpetuation of norms and as a means to establish organizational control. By using 
forms, interactions between people can be (pre)structured, according to what is deemed important within 
the bureaucratic organization. If frontline officials are urged and trained to use documents to ‘process 
citizens’, but also to guide them in conversing with citizens, how does this influence their relationship 
with citizens? Do these documents perpetuate the unequal power balance between officials and citizens? 
Or do they enable officials to be more open towards citizens? When documents are intended to curtail 
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officials’ discretion and steer officials’ actions within an interaction, this logically hampers a trust-based 
interpersonal relationship.  
Signals as shortcuts  
A final aspect affecting street-level judgment and decision-making is the pervasive uncertainty 
frontline officials deal with in interactions with citizens (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). It has 
been suggested that they look for signals or cues that are believed to be linked to citizens’ unobserved 
properties (i.e. trustworthiness) to reduce this uncertainty (Gambetta & Hamill, 2005; Mennerick, 
1974; Raaphorst & Groeneveld, 2015). Social workers, for instance, look at citizens co-
cooperativeness in the interaction to know something more about his/her deservingness. Employers 
look at job applicants’ educational level to gain insight in that person’s competences. The sorting of 
cues, it is held, is based on social typologies of citizens (Mennerick, 1974). These typologies are held 
to provide strategic information, where formal categories are lacking.  
Although this matching of cues to social typologies reduces uncertainty, there is always the danger of 
classifying citizens wrongly as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or as trustworthy or untrustworthy. Initial encounters 
between frontline workers and citizens may be pervaded by uncertainty and fear on the part of 
workers, and within this context ‘workers are likely to employ stigmatizing social identities to get a 
fix on a person and in so doing put themselves on the defensive, keenly attuned to their own safety’ 
(Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003: 91). The use of social typologies could thus reinforce existing 
stereotypes regarding citizens, which could be difficult for the latter to break through.  
This interpretation of signals is not only affected by the uncertainty in interaction, but also by 
officials’ mind-sets. If officials have a tendency to distrust or trust (certain groups of) citizens, they 
will probably primarily discern the signals and cues conforming this view (Van de Walle & Six, 
2014). How cues and signals are interpreted is not a purely individual matter, but affected by the 
organizational culture and social typologies shared by society at large (Raaphorst & Groeneveld, 
2015).  
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Although the ‘selective perception’ of cues is inevitable, since people cannot go beyond their own 
perspective, the question for practitioners is whether officials’ interpretation, fed by cultural beliefs, is 
reconcilable with democratic notions of equality and fairness. When societal or organizational cultural 
beliefs regarding citizens’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness ‘leak’ into the public encounter, what 
does this mean for equal treatment of citizens? When frontline officials have more room to establish 
trust-based encounters with citizens, do governments then also allow more room for individual 
differences between public officials’ judgments? This demonstrates that the public sector’s move to 
trust-based working also comes with important caveats.  
 
Trust in the public sector: Emerging topics and research agenda  
We end this chapter by formulating a brief research agenda outlining a number of emerging issues in 
the field of public administration.  
Citizen behaviour  
Signals and scholarly work on the alleged trust gap between the public sector and citizens point in 
different directions. Where data is available, there is no apparent trend of decreasing citizen trust in 
the government (Van de Walle, 2008). Citizens tend to trust specific institutions such as schools, 
health systems or fire services, whereas they have low trust in more abstract notions as public 
administration, civil servants or bureaucrats (Van de Walle & Van Ryzin, 2011). However, to know 
more about whether citizens trust the government, scholars should not only look at their attitudes, but 
also study their behaviour. Future studies should more closely examine citizen behaviour that seems 
to stem from a distrusting or low-trusting stance toward the government, such as complaining, 
aggressiveness toward frontline officials, lawsuits and exit behaviour.  
The effects of trust-based working  
Whereas citizens’ trust in the public sector receives scholarly attention, the other side of the trust gap 
– government’s trust in citizens – is barely studied (but see: Keulemans, 2015; Moyson et al., 2016; 
Raaphorst & Groeneveld, 2015; Yang, 2005). Whereas there is a trend towards trust-based 
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collaboration with citizens, the scholarly attention to whether officials, indeed, trust citizens is lagging 
behind. Future research could study whether and how trust is created in institutions as well as in 
interpersonal interactions. The trend towards trust-based working is moreover based on expectations 
about the alleged positive effects of more trust, such as a reduction of red tape and transaction costs. 
Public administration scholars should focus on what the effects of trust-based working actually are, 
also looking more broadly and non-normatively at the consequences for citizens.  
Socialization of public officials  
Studies have suggested that frontline officials become more cynical as they are longer in service and 
have experienced more disappointing interactions with citizens (Blau, 1960; Engbersen, 2006). This 
could imply that more tenured officials have a different attitude towards citizens than newcomers. 
This raises questions as to how newcomers are socialized in the public organization; what do they 
learn, and how do their attitudes evolve over time? What is the role of interactions with citizens in 
how public officials’ attitudes are shaped? And also important: how do public organizations deal with 
differences in attitudes between employees? Public administration scholars should focus more on how 
newcomers in public organisations ‘learn the ropes’ and how they learn to interact with citizens (see 
Oberfield, 2014 for a good example). The street-level bureaucracy literature suggests that officials’ 
mind-sets are important in how citizens are judged and classified. This raises issues for practitioners 
working with newcomers in the public sector, since officials’ dispositions are probably acquired 
through organizational socialization, but also through socialization earlier in life. Does the public 
sector want officials with a low-trust attitude or high-trust attitude? And is there also room for 
distrust? These are all questions that arise when public sectors promote trust and collaboration, that 
need not to be addressed by scholars, but by policy makers and public managers.  
Consequences for public values 
The classical Weberian perspective on bureaucracy conceives of it as an apparatus serving the larger 
powers, that is characterized by a clear and hierarchical ‘sphere of competence’ (Weber, 1921/1968), in 
which bureaucrats ideally work according to rules, procedures and policies as to safeguard ‘expertise, 
equality, and reliability over arbitrariness, power abuse, and personal whims’ (Bartels, 2013: 470). In 
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this ideal typical model, ‘bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is “dehumanized”, the 
more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, 
irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation’ (Weber, 1921/1968: 973). Clearly, within 
this ideal typical view on bureaucracy there is no room for trust between officials and citizens. As an 
interpersonal notion, trust brings in human judgment. Whereas trust is considered a valuable thing 
within today’s collaborative forms of governance, from a more traditional view of bureaucracy all 
interactions between officials and citizens should be neutral and guided by rules and procedures. Our 
main task as scholars is not to take stances in this debate, but to closely follow the developments in 
the public sector and critically analyse them against the notions on which democracy is based, and the 
consequences these developments have for how the government carries out its tasks and how citizens 
are treated.    
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